Same old, same old?  I couldn’t help but identify similarities and connect some dots between this 18th century essay, published in the 1766 January 23 edition of THE PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL, at the height of Stamp Act resistance and the beginning of the American Revolution, to today’s debt ceiling/default crisis.  Perhaps this 18th century newspaper article can shed some light and perspective on the potential consequences of massive debts and default.

To the PRINTER

IT is of great importance that the lovers of liberty be convinced, that if Great-Britain should push matters to the last extremity to execute the Stamp-act, we shall be able to maintain our ground, and she obliged to desist; for such a conviction will tend strongly to animate the courage of all to struggle chearfully[sic] with temporary difficulties, as they will see that we are not engaged in a desperate cause. This may apologize for my attempting to shew, in addition to what was said in my former letter, how the credit of the government will be affected, if their American commerce be lost, or stopped for a time.

The credit of states is much of the same nature with that of private men. A merchant or tradesman are said to be in good credit, when his visible gains are greater than his expenses, when he makes punctual payments, and the wares he fells may be depended upon as to their goodness and value, and when those who deal with him can have a reasonable assurance that he will make a profit by the commodities they intrust him with: and if it should happen otherwise, that he has a remaining substance sufficient to answer all demands. Such men will be trusted with near as much as they are worth and some times more, at the lowest price for the goods they buy, and the lowest interest for the money they borrow. So a nation may be said to be in good credit, when it has ample revenues, and is not incumbered with debts, or if that should be the case, has at hand effectual and equitable means to discharge them; when her public expenses do not exceed what can easily be raised without overburdening the people with taxes, or if they do exceed at any time, she is able to make abundant provision for them; and when the subjects have a reasonable assurance that the government is well able to fulfill punctually all her contracts with them. Hence it is easy to see that the credit of a state is to be kept up in the same way that private men maintain theirs, viz. by securing to itself the means of doing justice to particulars, and always doing it with the strictest honour; any chicane or appearance of disability will necessarily have the same effect here as among individuals. Indeed states are more concerned to keep up a good opinion of their integrity than private men; because those that trust them have only their honour and interest to depend upon for payment. —— Let us now-see whether Great Britain will be able punctually to fulfill her engagements with her subjects, if her intercourse with America be cut off; and but a very superficial view of the present state of the nation will be sufficient to determine this point. For it well known that their public debts are swelled to an enormous size; above one hundred and thirty millions have been borrowed to defray the expenses of the various wars they have been engaged in, for which their standing revenue has been insufficient. Of this prodigious sum but a small part has been occasioned by the defence[sic] of America. Almost every considerable branch of the revenue is appropriated to the discharge of the interest of the several loans, as it becomes annually due. The sinking fund, which is made of the surplusages[sic] that arise from those taxes and impositions that produce more than the sums charged on them, is expected to pay off the principal after a certain number of years. As the government has been able hitherto to perform punctually all its bargains with the subjects, because these branches of the revenue have produced money enough to answer all demands upon them, or if at any time they have happened to be deficient, it has been easy to provide for that deficiency, public credit has been unshaken; men of property have been ready to advance their money, whenever a vote of parliament has called for it, because they had a reasonable assurance that the interest voted would be regularly paid, and the principal be secure. Not it is plain that if the parliament becomes unable to fulfill its contracts with the subjects, all confidence in them must expire: but whenever those branches of the revenue are by any accident so lessened as to become not sufficient to pay the interest of the sums charged upon them, and no new ways of raising money occur, every one must see it will be impossible for them to fulfill their contracts any longer. Now this will infallibly be the event if they loose their trade to this continent. For the whole revenue will be affected, and many of its most considerable branches exceedingly reduced, yea entirely ruined.

Now some of the principal articles of the revenue that are mortgaged for the payment of the national debt are these, a poundage on goods exported and imported, that is, a subsidy of one shilling in the pound on all commodities imported into, or exported out of the kingdom, except some few articles allowed to be imported & exported duty free, the duty on candles, coals, and cinders, the malt tax, that on all spirituous liquors & the duty on tobacco. But if the exports out of the kingdom are lessened to the value of two or three millions (which will be the case if exportation to this continent cease) the aforesaid subsidy on goods exported must be lessened in proportion to that prodigious sum. So if above a million of the manufacturers of Great-Britain are turned out of employ, and reduced to the most distressing poverty (which I have shewn in my last will be a consequence of the loss of the American trade) the consumption of candles, coals, and cinders, malt, sprituous[sic] liquors, and tobacco will be prodigiously lessened, because a great part of the consumers will be unable to pay for them. But these duties produce more or less always in proportion to the encreased or diminished consumption of the articles mentioned. Hence they will soon prove insufficient for the payment of the sums charged upon them. Therefore the government will have no other way to fulfill its obligations to the subjects but by contriving new taxes to supply the deficiency so arising; but in so great and general a decay of trade that method will be plainly impracticable. The revenue then must prove unequal to the annual demands upon it; whenever this happens, the subjects must be deprived of what is justly due to them; the proprietors of the public funds will sell out as fast as possible, for every one will try to save himself as well as he can in the general ruin; this will occasion stocks to fall away suddenly to nothing. Transferable annuities with all the security the government can give will be little valued, and all confidence in parliamentary faith destroyed. But almost all the monied men in the nation are more or less interested in those funds, and many have lent their whole fortunes to the public, supposing the principal always secure, and that the interest would be punctually paid; the latter would be reduced to beggary, and every one of the former would be sufferers, as the nation is more or less deeply indebted to them. Such an event as this must involve the government in the utmost confusion and distraction; all orders of men would be affected, and a kind of universal bankruptcy ensue. It is not possible to conceive the rage and indignation that would boil in every breast. To see multitudes of families by their confidence in the public faith tumbled in an instant from affluence and splendor to the lowest depths of penury and distress, while all are feeling the effects of the general ruin, will inflame even unprejudiced spectators against the government that betrayed them; much more than the unhappy sufferers. In short it appears to me highly probable that such a catastrophe would be very near unhinging the constitution itself, and reducing them to as chaotic a state, as the earth was at first, when it was without form and void, and darkness covered the face of the deep.

It would exceed the limits of this paper, to paint all the consequences of a loss of the public credit; it is plain they would be terrible and lasting. If parliamentary faith is once violated, it will be the work of ages to recover the lost confidence of the subject; none will be willing to advance their money on securities given by the government, through the necessity that calls for it be ever so urgent, unless such an enormous interest is allowed, as will attone[sic] for the risk they run. Great-Britain, unless she is perfectly infatuated, will certainly take a special care to maintain her public credit; but it is obvious from the deduction given above, that this cannot be done without preserving her trade to America. In a very few years such growing deficiencies in the revenue must arise, if our intercourse with her is stopped, as will highly perplex the Ministry and Parliament, distress many individuals, and raise a general alarm throughout the nation. Multitudes will see that it is impossible for them to live without us, and whatever besotted orders may have been given respecting the seizure of our ships, they will be forced, in spite of their utmost resolution, to recall them; or if a fit of madness should size the bulk of the nation, so that they determine to put all to the risque rather than not compel us to submit, we may rest assured that their public credit cannot long survive such a determination, but if that once fails, Great-Britain will not be in a condition to attempt any thing very formidable against us. We have therefore all the assurance, that the nature of the thing admits, that if we are but unanimous, steadily refuse the stamps, transact all business as usual without them, cultivate a spirit of frugality and industry, and persist in the noble resolution of declining all commerce with our mother country, we shall in a few years at farthest compleat[sic] our deliverance from the present meditated scheme of oppression, and effectually establish our liberties for the future.

PHILELEUTHERUS.

This past weekend, a similar slogan jumped out at me as I was reading the 1774 September 5 Massachusetts Gazette, which is loaded with fascinating content related to the Powder Alarm, and the forced resignations and Massachusetts turbulence caused by the Massachusetts Government Act.  It was one short paragraph, two sentences long, under the dateline “BOSTON, September 5,” that stood out on the third page of the issue:

The spirit of the people, was never known to be so great since the first settlement of the colonies, as it is at this time. People in the country for hundreds of miles, are prepared and determine[d] to “DIE or be FREE.”

“Die or be free” was published by a handful of newspapers throughout the colonies in late 1774 (RI, CT, MA) and then again after Lexington and Concord in 1775 (CT, NY, VA, PA, MA, RI, MD). It also appeared as early as 1769 in the masthead of Solomon Southwick’s Newport Mercury: “Undaunted by Tyrants – we’ll die or be Free”.

In the summer, representatives from towns in Suffolk County, met together, and agreed to a set of resolutions drafted by Dr. Joseph Warren. These “Suffolk Resolves” proclaimed the Intolerable Acts to be unconstitutional and recommended sanctions against Britain. They also urged the people of Massachusetts to form their own government, and prepare to fight in its defense.

After the vote, Paul Revere saddled his horse and carried the Suffolk Resolves to Philadelphia. His mission was urgent. The Continental Congress was in session and waiting for news from New England. Revere left Boston on September 11, 1774, and reached Philadelphia on September 16, nearly 350 miles on rough and winding 18th-century roads in the unprecedented time of five days. The next day, Congress agreed to a ringing endorsement of the Suffolk Resolves — a decisive step on the road to revolution. Paul Revere started home again on September 18, and was in Boston on the 23rd, with news that greatly encouraged resistance in New England.

The response that Paul Revere brought back to Boston, as printed in the New-Hampshire Gazette, is pictured below. Mention of Paul Revere, particularly with reference to a famous ride like this one, is extremely rare.

I’ve only read the first four chapters (of 10) so far, but I already place Defiance of the Patriots safely among my favorite history books. In fact, it may be top 10 material. J.L. Bell of Boston 1775 puts it best: “For folks interested in the real story of the Tea Party, Defiance of the Patriots is the most thorough and wide-ranging account out there.”

I first heard about Defiance of the Patriots back in April. I had just shared, via Rag Linen, a 1774 newspaper report on the unexpected consequences of the Boston Tea Party. Not long after sharing the historic report, I learned, via Twitter, from J.L. Bell, that the 1774 news item confirms the thesis of Benjamin Carp’s upcoming book. Specifically, that pressure to look good to other ports made Bostonians act radical.

Excited for the new book and its in-depth analysis of the Boston Tea Party, especially after reading this Tufts Journal piece, I contacted Benjamin and invited him to contribute a short piece for the readers of Rag Linen. Benjamin was very kind to accept my offer and has even shared some excerpts from his book, which are appropriately themed. Without further ado…

In 1773, newspapers were the colonists’ primary means of communicating and influencing public opinion. Parliament had passed the Tea Act, and Bostonians were mobilizing against what they regarded as an unjust law. This political movement had two crucial ingredients: communication between Boston and its neighboring towns (who helped comprise the “Body of the People” meetings at the Old South Meeting House), and communication between Boston and the other cities that were receiving tea shipments from the East India Company: New York City, Philadelphia, and Charleston. Neighboring towns and sister cities helped to spread the reasons for resistance and build an atmosphere of mutual reassurance. Newspapers also helped to draw boundaries within the community by publishing threats to the consignees—the merchants who were designated to receive the tea shipments from the East India Company. The consignees and their supporters tried to give as good as they got in the newspapers, but they failed to sway public opinion.

Here are two excerpts from the book that help to illustrate the significance of newspapers. The first, from page 84, describes Bostonians’ reaction to news of the Tea Act, and the newspaper squabbles that followed.

The consignees . . . had no desire to turn down the lucrative Company contract. Richard Clarke took to the newspapers, as “Z.,” to argue that the Tea Act wasn’t such a bad thing. By eliminating the middleman, the new law would make tea cheaper. He was confused about why the Tea Act suddenly caused Bostonians to yelp about the Townshend duty, since the people of Massachusetts had been importing plenty of dutied tea over the last few years. For that matter, Americans silently paid much more to Parliament in duties on wine, sugar, and molasses—why complain about tea? . . . Finally, Clarke argued, the East India Company could prove to be an ally in the fight for charter rights, and might help Americans get the tea duty removed—so long as the colonists didn’t try to ruin the Company’s sales with “unsuitable Behaviour.”

But these arguments failed to sway public opinion in Boston, where the public was forming ranks alongside the Sons of Liberty.

Instead, the consignees began to hear warnings about what would happen to them if they defied their neighbors. On November 1, the Boston Gazette reprinted a letter from “PHILELEUTHEROS” (Greek for “freedom lover”). “Secure yourselves,” this New York writer warned, “from the gathering storm, before it . . . overwhelms you with a sudden, dreadful, and sure destruction.” If the consignees persisted in injuring their country by importing tea, they would not be safe no matter how many troops and fortified walls might surround them. “You cannot readily become your own cooks, butchers, butlers, nor bakers: You will therefore be liable, to be suddenly, and unexpectedly taken off, in the midst of your confidence and supposed security, by those whom you may chance to confide in, and employ. ”The author called upon a local Brutus or Cassius “to sheath their daggers in the hearts of such base, such abandoned and infamous Parricides.” If the consignees hoped to profit from their treason, the author warned, the triumph would be short-lived. Guilt, hatred, and infamy would be their lot for generations to come. The choice was now the consignees’ to make. Threats to their safety lurked around every corner. The consignees would have to watch their backs.

This second passage, from page 139, describes the aftermath of the Boston Tea Party.

The tide swelled into Boston harbor overnight. There was no moonlight to mark the tea’s passage as it slipped away on the churning waves. Eventually the broken chests and clumps of tea formed a floating line, like a winrow of hay, along the surface of the water. The line ran from the South End of Boston along the Dorchester shore to Castle Island, almost as a taunt to the consignees and commissioners. “Those persons who were from the country returned with a merry heart; and the next day joy appeared in almost every countenance, some on occasion of the destruction of the tea, others on account of the quietness with which it was effected.”

Of course, not every countenance was joyful. Admiral John Montagu had been forced to watch the destruction of the tea without being able to lift a finger in response. On the morning after the Tea Party, he took a stroll on the wharf and looked with astonishment at the scene of devastation. He asked some of the Bostonians, “who was to pay the fidler” now? Perhaps they answered with a sudden fear and foreboding, perhaps with a jeering smugness. “The Devil is in this people,” Montagu concluded, “for they pay no more respect to an act of the British Parliament, which can make England tremble, than to an old newspaper.” He then stalked off the wharf.

That said, it was interesting to find the October 24, 1771 Massachusetts Spy had stacked one news brief about the repeal of the American tea bill on top of a blurb about Captain Preston of the Boston Massacre. See the ironic placement below.

Dunlap was the printer of the first copies of the Declaration of Independence although his Packet was second to print the full text of the Declaration (July 8, 1776) after The Pennsylvania Evening Post (July 6, 1776).  The Pennsylvania Packet eventually became the first daily newspaper in America with its September 21, 1784 issue.

Below is the full text of Dunlap’s colonial newspaper launch announcement, as published in the October 21, 1771 issue of The Massachusetts Spy. Click to enlarge.

All America is in a flame on account of Tea-Exportation. The New-Yorkers as well as the Bostonians and Philadelphians, are, it seems, determined that no Tea shall be landed. They have published a paper in numbers called the Alarm. It begins first with “Dear Countrymen,” and then goes on exhorting them to open their eyes, and like the Sons of Liberty throw off all connection with the tyrant their Mother Country. They have on this occasion raised a company of artillery, and every day almost are practicing at a target. Their independent companies are out at exercise every day. The minds of the lower people are inflamed by the examples of some of their principals. They swear that they will burn every ship that comes in; but I believe our six and twelve pounders, with the Royal Welsh Fuziliers, will prevent any thing of that kind.

The Alarm being referenced was a broadside authored by John Dickinson in which urged “Beware of the East-India Company.”

The exact excerpt from above, as published in the April 18, 1774 Dunlap’s Pennsylvania Packet, under the dateline London, January 25, appears below. Following are two more interesting letter extracts from the same newspaper that present excellent perspective and insight into the colonial (not just Boston) tension percolating in late 1773 and early 1774.

Also read Boston 1775′s “Boston Mobilizes Against the Tea“.

According to the Packet, “it is said that the tea thrown into the Sea at Boston is valued at 18,000 l. at 1s. 6d. per pound. The whole sent to America is said to be worth about 300,000 l. which is returning home, not being suffered to be landed.”

Using the Bank of England’s inflation calculator, £18,000 in 1774 (I rounded up) translates to £2,023,200 today.  That’s an average of two percent inflation per year. Converting £2.023 million to USD via XE.com, I found the value of the tea destroyed on December 16, 1773 to be $3,091,687 (more than $2 million higher than the History Channel’s estimate).

According to Wesley Griswold’s The Night The Revolution Began “the figure varies with nearly every source, and ranges from as low as £8000 to as high as £18000.”

So I checked to see if the History Channel was using the low estimate.  Using the £8000 variable, I found today’s value of the tea destroyed on December 16, 1773 is $1,374,083 (still much higher than the History Channel’s quote).

If £8000 was the low estimate and £18,000 was the high, that leaves £13,000 as the median estimate. Figuring £13,000 would be the most accurate measure, I threw it in the inflation and conversion calculators and found today’s value of the tea dumped in Boston harbor on December 16, 1773 to be $2,232,885.

Can anyone tell me how/where the History Channel came up with $1 million?  What’s the most accurate estimate?